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I estimate, using real-time data, a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function that
is dynamic and that also accounts for the fact that there are substantial restrictions in the
period-to-period changes of the Fed￿ s policy instrument. I ￿nd a substantial contrast between
the periods before and after Paul Volcker￿ s appointment as Fed Chairman in 1979, both in terms
of the Fed￿ s response to expected in￿ ation and in terms of its response to the (perceived) output
gap: In the pre-Volcker era the Fed￿ s response to in￿ ation was substantially weaker than in the
Volcker-Greenspan era; conversely, the Fed seems to have been more responsive to real activity
in the pre-Volcker era than later.
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11 Introduction
One question that has received much attention in recent work on US monetary policy is that of the
contrast in US macroeconomic performance between the periods before and after the appointment of
Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve in August of 1979, and of the causes of that contrast.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the late 1960s and the 1970s were a period of relative macroeconomic
instability, as they were characterized by high and volatile rates of in￿ ation. This era of the Great
In￿ation contrasts starkly however with what followed after Paul Volcker￿ s appointment, namely a
period of low in￿ ation and stable output growth.
Understanding the causes of this dramatic change is essential both for a fair historical assessment
of past policies and for the design of a better monetary policy for the future. This issue has thus
justi￿ably been scrutinized in numerous studies, and various explanations have been proposed.
One in￿ uential line of research focuses mainly on intertemporal di⁄erences in monetary policy and
emphasizes the role that improved policies in the Volcker-Greenspan eras played in achieving better
macroeconomic outcomes during the 1980s and the 1990s.
This literature that focuses mostly on the role of monetary policy makes extensive use of single
equation reaction functions for the Federal Reserve, also known as Taylor rules, that link the Fed￿ s
policy instrument (typically taken to be monthly or quarterly averages of the federal funds rate -
the interest rate that banks charge each other for overnight loans of Federal Reserve deposits) to
measures of the in￿ ation gap and of the real output gap1 (or of the unemployment gap). Such
reaction functions are compatible with broadly held views about what the central goals of US
monetary policy are, and appropriately chosen rules from that family of reaction functions can have
both a normative and a positive justi￿cation (see, inter alia, Taylor (1993), Judd and Rudebusch
(1998), and Clarida Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) ).
One of the better known papers from that literature that uses reaction functions is Clarida,
Gal￿, and Gertler (2000) (henceforth CGG). CGG take a standard Taylor rule and augment it
by introducing dynamics, in the form of lags of the dependent variable as additional explanatory
1The in￿ ation and output gaps are gaps of these variables from their desired target levels.
2variables, and they also employ a forward-looking framework. Both of these arguably capture salient
features of the Federal Reserve￿ s behavior:
The lags of the policy instruments allow for a certain degree of inertia and for possible partial
adjustment, which is compatible with the widely held view that the Fed tends to smooth changes
in interest rates - something also evident in the data. In particular, the Fed tends to adjust its
target for the federal funds rate in a cautious manner, and only gradually, with slow, stodgy steps,
at discrete points in time. Reasons for this inertia in monetary policy include data uncertainty, and
more generally uncertainty about the structure of the economy. Indeed, Fed actions, taken on the
basis of possibly inaccurate real-time information, that prove ex-post to have been too aggressive
and to have been taken too hastily would compromise the monetary authority￿ s credibility.
The forward looking framework is one where forecasts of in￿ ation and the output gap for one or
more periods ahead are employed in the reaction function, rather than contemporaneous or lagged
values for these variables (of a backward looking speci￿cation). Thus, the forward looking speci￿ca-
tion essentially implies that the Fed considers a broader information set in determining the target
level for its policy instrument, rather than being restricted to considering only contemporaneous
or past values of the output and in￿ ation gaps, and it also gives a more realistic description of
how sophisticated monetary policy ought to look like in the face of likely lags in the monetary
transmission mechanism.
CGG estimate such a dynamic and forward-looking reaction function for the postwar U.S. econ-
omy. Their central ￿nding is that monetary policy prior to Volcker￿ s appointment accommodated
in￿ation - the Fed typically raised the nominal interest rates by less than the increase in expected
in￿ ation, which would thus result in a lower real interest rate2, while in the Volcker-Greenspan era
the Fed drastically changed its approach and adopted a much more anti-in￿ ationary stance, raising
not only nominal, but also real interest rates in response to increases in expected in￿ ation; it thus
contributed, at a very minimum, to the transition from the volatile 1970s to the rosy 1980s and
1990s - a period of stability and low in￿ ation.
2Thus, the Pre-Volcker Fed did not satisfy Taylor￿ s principle.
3This is perhaps not a surprising ￿nding to many - indeed the notion that Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan did a superior job in conducting monetary policy than their predecessors may sound by
now more like conventional wisdom than like a controversial proposition. Nevertheless this central
empirical ￿nding of CGG of a stark, dramatic contrast between the pre- and post- Volcker conduct
of monetary policy has been at the center of much recent attention (probably justi￿ably given the
importance of the question) and has been complemented, re￿ned, or even challenged on several
grounds in subsequent research.
Related Past Literature
First, there is another in￿ uential subset of the recent literature on U.S. monetary policy that focuses
more on shocks and on changes in their volatilities, rather than on changes in monetary policy. This
literature (see, inter alia, Kim and Nelson (1999b), Sims (1999), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Stock
and Watson (2003), and Sims and Zha (2004) ) emphasizes the role of non-policy shocks, whose
volatility was higher in the pre-Volcker era than in the Volcker-Greenspan era, and it argues that it
was this, rather than any policy changes, that was the central factor behind the observed dramatic
change in macroeconomic outcomes of the two periods.
Yet another interesting line of recent work argues that changes in U.S. monetary policy were
more gradual than suggested by CGG or that there were richer dynamics than suggested by the
simple split-sample approach and concentrates on estimating reaction functions using Time Varying
Parameter approaches. Papers along these lines include Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2002), Boivin
(2004), and Jalil (2004).
Furthermore, and as Orphanides demonstrates in his in￿ uential 2001 paper, it is essential, when
trying to reach policy conclusions on the basis of estimated reaction functions, to use real-time
data, that is data that were actually available to the Federal Open Markets Committee at the time
their decisions were made, rather than revised data series (typically used in applied work prior to
Orphanides￿contribution) that became available only ex post.
Orphanides extends this approach further in subsequent papers (such as Orphanides (2002,
42004)), and ￿nds, using such real-time data and forward-looking reaction functions that, in contrast
to the CGG conclusions, monetary policy in the pre-Volcker era, far from being accommodative
to in￿ ation, was in a similar manner to the Volcker-Greenspan era, activist, forward-looking, and
strong and decisive in its reaction to in￿ ationary surges. While this contradicts the CGG conclusion
that the instability of the 1970s was at least in part due to weak monetary policy, Orphanides also
￿nds that monetary policy prior to Volcker￿ s appointment was "too activist in reacting to perceived
output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious"3. That is, the Fed￿ s real-time estimates
of potential output were upwardly biased, and this resulted in the Fed responding to these biased
estimates by following policies that in retrospect, and using the knowledge of the revised and
corrected estimates of the output gap, would be judged to have been too expansionary, which thus
probably contributed to the instability and in￿ ationary pressures of that period.
All the contributions outlined above are not mutually exclusive and should be taken into account
in careful attempts to assess the historical evolution of U.S. monetary policy and of its impact on
the economy. However, one issue which, while equally important, has not been given nearly as much
attention in the literature is that of characterizing the Fed￿ s policy instrument, and speci￿cally, of
determining what exactly the nature of the policy instrument is, and of taking into account the
speci￿cs of its time series behavior in estimation exercises of reaction functions.
Characterizing the Fed￿ s Policy Instrument
As suggested above, the obvious candidate for the Fed￿ s policy instrument is the federal funds rate
- indeed that has been the presumed policy instrument in most of the studies that investigate U.S.
monetary policy with Taylor rules, including the ones outlined above. While there is no explicit
institutional directive that de￿nes the federal funds rate (or any other variable) to be the Fed￿ s
policy instrument, related empirical work, including Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke
and Mihov (1998) establishes that, with a possible exception of non-borrowed reserve targeting for
a brief period during the ￿rst three years of Paul Volcker￿ s tenure, the Fed has indeed treated the
3Orphanides (2004).
5fed funds rate as its policy instrument4.
Further evidence to this is provided by the fact that the Fed has been explicitly announcing a
target for the fed funds rate (henceforth the target) since 1994, usually during Federal Open Market
Committee meetings, but sometimes in between such meetings too. Even before 1994 changes in the
target were quite accurately inferred by the market. Indeed, as Hamilton and Jord￿ (2002) note,
the Wall Street Journal would report any movements of the target on a daily basis, and related
academic literature has compiled time series of target changes for periods prior to 1994 (such as
Cook and Hahn (1989) for the mid- and late 1970￿ s and Rudebusch (1995) for the mid-1980￿ s and
later)5. Announcements of changes or no changes to the target, and in general news related to the
target and its movements has always been the subject of intense interest by the markets, precisely
because the fed funds rate and its target are understood to be the policy instrument of the Federal
Reserve.
However, there are quite severe restrictions in the way the target changes from period to period:
At any given period the target either will not change at all or it will change, by multiples of 25
basis points since November of 1989 and by multiples of 6.25 basis points earlier. Thus, the changes
in the target fall into a small number of discrete categories. This discreteness is preserved when
monthly averages of the target6 are considered too: For example, for the Greenspan period7, the
changes in monthly averages of the target are equal to 0 for 42.4% of the time.
Essentially the same holds true for periodic averages of the federal funds rate: Once the target
has been determined, it is then the task of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and of its trading
desk in particular, to conduct open market operations (purchases or sales of Treasury securities),
based on careful monitoring of commercial banks￿reserve requirements and available Fed deposits,
4Even for these three years at the start of Volcker￿ s term, it is being argued (see, for example, Goodfriend (1991))
that the Fed had an implicit target for the federal funds rate.
5For further details on the mechanics, history, and stylized facts of setting the target one can read, inter alia,
Meulendyke (1998), Hamilton and Jord￿ (2002), Piazzesi (2001), and Dueker (1999).
6The monthly averages of the target are taken at the "FOMC frequency", that is, over months during which there
was an Federal Open Markets Committee meeting. The reason is that it is only during those months that Greenbook
forecasts (that are used to construct the explanatory variables of the reaction functions estimated in this paper) were
available. Further details on the data used are provided in Section 3.
7The sample used in this study ends in June of 1998.
6so as to implement the set target. In other words, the New York Fed essentially acts as the Fed￿ s
broker, and ensures that the fed funds rate never ￿ uctuates too far away from the set target. This
fact is further illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the time series of monthly averages of the e⁄ective
fed funds rate, of monthly averages of the target, and of end-of-month values of the target and
shows how these three series are almost indistinguishable from each other.
Contributions of this Paper
It is thus evident that there are severe restrictions in the way the Fed￿ s policy instrument changes
from period to period, and so these restrictions ought to be taken into account in modeling and
estimation exercises of Fed reaction functions. Estimating linear reaction functions with Gaussian
error terms ignores these restrictions to the support space of the dependent variable and may thus
lead to serious biases. However, little work has been done in that direction. All of the literature
outlined above, and nearly all of the rest of the literature in the area employs linear speci￿cations
with Gaussian error terms. One exception to this paradigm is Hamilton and Jord￿ (2002), who
propose the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) approach which allows them to model the
target as a discrete time series variable. However, this approach is more geared towards forecasting
and falls outside the Taylor rule framework of all the studies that have been outlined above. Also,
Dueker (1999a) takes these restrictions into account as he models the reaction function using a
multinomial ordered probit for the changes of the target, (which is the approach adopted here too).
However he does not account for possible serial correlation in the residuals, which is likely to be
present.
In general, most existing applied macroeconomic work, including the work on monetary policy
reaction functions, either ignores the restrictions to the support space of the dependent variable
under consideration and focuses on the needed time series modeling requirements, or, conversely,
employs Limited Dependent Variable estimation techniques at the expense of time series modeling.
The main reason for that is that incorporating both of these at the same time results in an estimation
task that presents the researcher with formidable computational challenges because of the need for
7integration of multiple integrals with no closed form solution whose dimensionality can be the same
as the time series dimension of the data, and/or because of the need for numerical optimization of
di¢ cult objective functions.
The econometric contribution of this paper is that I propose a ￿ exible and practical algorith-
mic framework that overcomes the multiple integral problem by using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(henceforth MCMC) simulation techniques with data augmentation, whereby simulated samples of
the latent variables typically used to model probits are generated from their model-implied con-
ditional distributions. I propose a new and computationally attractive way of implementing the
required smoothing algorithm for the generation of the latent variables that relies on the joint
distributions of the latent residuals.
An added advantage of the MCMC approach and of the Gibbs sampler that is employed in
this paper in particular is that additional time series features, such as Regime Switching, or Time
Varying Parameters, that would substantially complicate the needed computational tasks in an
extremum framework, can be easily introduced in the MCMC context as additional blocks in the
Gibbs sampler, and this paper illustrates how this is done.
Finally, I overcome the additional computational challenges associated with di¢ cult numerical
optimizations by proposing a Bayes estimator that is a statistic of the simulated posterior distrib-
ution of interest, and which thus falls outside the extremum framework.
The macroeconomic contribution of the paper is that, in contrast to past literature, I model the
Fed￿ s reaction function in a way that does not ignore the discrete nature of the changes in the Fed￿ s
policy instrument, while also taking into account contributions of past literature, such as the ones
outlined earlier. Speci￿cally, I estimate, using real-time data compiled from Greenbook forecasts
of the Federal Reserve, a forward-looking, dynamic ordered probit reaction function, and I also
consider a series of extensions and robustness checks.
My central ￿nding is that, while there is some evidence that the Fed was more activist in
its response to real-time estimates of the output gap in the pre-Volcker era than later, there
is also strong evidence that it was much less aggressive in its response to in￿ ation in the pre-
8Volcker era than later. Thus, while the Fed￿ s possibly excessive responsiveness to inaccurate
real-time estimates of the output gap probably contributed to the instability of the 1970s, it
is apparent that, as CGG claim, the Pre-Volcker Fed￿ s less than aggressive stance in ￿ghting
in￿ ation, which changed dramatically with Volcker￿ s appointment, was a central factor behind
the observed contrast in macroeconomic performance between the 1970s and the 1980s-1990s.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 develops the benchmark model and
describes the associated estimation challenges, as well as the proposed estimation strategy that
overcomes these challenges. Section 3 describes the data used, Section 4 provides a discussion of the
estimation results of the benchmark model, while Section 5 considers a series of robustness checks
and extensions, and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. The details of the algorithms employed
in this paper are included in the Appendix.
2 A Forward Looking, Dynamic Ordered Probit Reaction Func-
tion for the Federal Reserve
A useful starting point is Taylor￿ s original speci￿cation for the reaction function of the Fed. Taylor
(1993) suggested a very speci￿c and simple linear rule:
fft = ￿t + ffN + 0:5(￿t ￿ ￿￿) + 0:5y
gap
t , (1)
where fft is the Fed￿ s policy instrument, the federal funds rate, ￿t is the rate of in￿ ation, ffN
is a natural real fed funds rate (that is, an equilibrium real fed funds rate that is consistent with
full employment), (￿t ￿ ￿￿) is the in￿ ation gap (that is, actual in￿ ation minus a target in￿ ation
rate), and y
gap
t is the output gap (the di⁄erence between real output and potential output). As we
can see from equation (1), Taylor did not estimate his reaction function. Rather, he suggested this
linear rule, with the assumed coe¢ cients of 0.5, and assumed rates of target in￿ ation and natural
real fed funds rate that are both 2%, as a useful and simple way to capture salient aspects of the
9way the Fed decides what the appropriate level for its policy instrument is at each period. Indeed,
rules such as this one can have a normative motivation, and are justi￿ed both in terms of what
the legislated goals of US monetary policy are, and have also been performing relatively well when
compared to other alternatives that the literature has proposed. For instance, and as Judd and
Rudebusch (1998) calculate for the rule of equation (1), the R2 for the Greenspan period is 87% for
quarterly levels of the nominal funds rate, and 52% for quarterly changes8. Taylor rules have been
used with similar success for other countries as well (such as, for example, Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler
(1998) who demonstrate the empirical relevance of Taylor rules for a set of European countries).
The literature on reaction functions that followed Taylor￿ s 1993 paper expanded the set of
speci￿cations considered and also generally took up the task of estimating such reaction functions.
As discussed earlier, two useful features that much recent work has incorporated into reaction
function speci￿cations are a forward looking framework and dynamics.
A forward-looking speci￿cation means that the Fed sets its policy instrument in response to its
expectations about future9 values of the in￿ ation and output gap variables. This is arguably a more
realistic depiction of the monetary authority￿ s behavior in the face of lags in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism that are generally present, and also it encompasses backward looking speci￿cations,
in the sense that a forward-looking Fed considers a broad information set in determining its forecasts
for the in￿ ation and output gaps, which includes past and present values of these variables.
In contrast to the speci￿cation of equation (1), which makes the restrictive assumption of an
immediate adjustment of the fed funds rate to the level dictated by the in￿ ation and output gap
variables, a dynamic speci￿cation is again a more realistic depiction of observed Fed behavior as it
captures the Fed￿ s well documented tendency to smooth interest rates10, which can also be easily
seen, for instance, in the actual time series for the fed funds rate, and can be obtained simply by
introducing lags of the policy instrument as additional explanatory variables11.
8However, this simple speci￿cation isn￿ t as successful in describing the Burns and the Volcker periods.
9Usually for a short forecast horizon.
10See, inter alia, Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), Taylor (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000), and Piazzesi (2001).
11Rotemberg and Woodford ( (1997), and (1999) - available in Taylor (1999) ) o⁄er an interesting motivation for the
lagged dependence aspect of interest rate smoothing practiced by the Fed, arguing that a dynamic reaction function
gives the Fed increased leverage over the long term interest rates , since the Fed can manipulate such long term rates
10Such a dynamic, forward looking reaction function for the Fed￿ s desired level for the federal
funds rate at time t, namely ff￿
t is given by (2):
ff￿
t = ￿ + ￿(L)ff￿




where ￿(L) = ￿1 + ￿2L + ::: + ￿nLn￿1, and where all of the roots of the associated polynomial
1 ￿ ￿1L ￿ ￿2L2 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿nLn lie outside the unit circle12. "￿
t ￿ N(0;￿2), ￿t;h is the h-period ahead
forecast of in￿ ation that the Fed made at time t, and y
gap
t;h is the h-period ahead forecast of the
output gap that the Fed made at time t. Thus, both of these are real-time forecasts, the de￿nitions
and details of which are provided in the data section that follows. Finally, and considering (2) in
the context of Taylor rules, the intercept term ￿ is modeled to capture both the natural real fed
funds rate, and the target in￿ ation rate, which are therefore not separately identi￿able.
However, and as argued in the introduction, a drawback of the linear speci￿cation of equation
(2) is that it neglects the discrete nature of the period-to-period movements of the Fed￿ s policy
instrument and thus that it may be confounding important aspects of the monetary policy making
process: The target does not change at all for about half the time, and when it does change, it does
so by multiples of 25 basis points (since November of 1989 and by multiples of 6.25 basis points
earlier). Thus, the period-to-period changes of the target for the fed funds rate have historically
fallen into a small number of categories13, and thus there is a clear distinction between this variable
and the dependent variable modeled by equation (2): Equation (2) is a linear speci￿cation with
a Gaussian error term, and it thus implies that there are no restrictions in the period-to-period
movements of its dependent variable.
In view of this, and in a spirit similar to that of, inter alia, Eichengreen et al. (1985), and Dueker
(and thus aggregate demand, thereby implementing desired stabilization policies) with smaller movements in the fed
funds rate and other short term rates than would be required in a static framework (to induce a movement in the
long term rates that is of the same magnitude).
12I make what is a standard assumption in the reaction function literature, namely that the policy instrument,
in￿ ation, and output gap variables are all stationary.
13The same is essentially the case for the averages of the e⁄ective fed funds rate, as Figure 2 demonstrates, and as
is implied by the fact that the Fed￿ s trading desk ensures that the actual fed funds rate never deviates too much from
the set target.
11(1999a,b), I propose a qualitative response approach that directly accounts for the discrete nature
of the changes in the policy instrument of the Fed, and that explicitly distinguishes this variable,
which is the one actually observed, from the Fed￿ s desired level for the federal funds rate, ff￿
t , that
is modeled as a latent variable, given by equation (2). While this latent variable is continuous,
the observed policy instrument is discrete, and in particular it changes only when enough pressure
for a change accumulates, that is, only when the di⁄erence between the actual value of the policy
instrument and the level at which the Fed would like it to be is of a certain size. The size of that
di⁄erence determines which, out of a small possible number of changes will take place.14
More speci￿cally, the model I propose is a probit of a particular kind; namely it is multinomial
and ordered because there are several possible outcomes (a modest number of possible amounts by
which the Fed can decide to change its target for the fed funds rate), and these outcomes are ranked
(as, for instance, it is recognized that an increase of 50 basis points is comparable to and ranks
higher than an increase of 25 basis points).
In particular, we have that:
￿fft 2 category j if ff￿
t ￿ fft￿1 2 (cj￿1;cj); j = 1;:::;J; (3)
where ff￿
t is the continuous latent variable of equation (2), and fft is the observed policy instrument
that changes only by one of J possible amounts at discrete points in time, and where c0;c1;:::;cJ
are the threshold coe¢ cients15 for movement between the J possible categories of change for the
policy instrument. So, the di⁄erence ff￿
t ￿ fft￿1 represents the distance between the desired level
of the fed funds rate this period (based on the reaction function of the Fed) and the actual level
for the fed funds rate last period; thus, and as mentioned above, it can be seen as a measure of the
"pressure" to change the fed funds rate in period t. The "intensity" of that pressure (that is, which
of the (cj￿1;cj) intervals (for j = 1;:::;J) ff￿
t ￿ fft￿1 falls into) determines which of the J possible
14Accounting for this distinction, that is explaining why the Fed chooses to move its policy instrument rather
infrequently, and only by one out of a small set of possible amounts when it does, rather than continuously, is beyond
the scope of this paper. Possible models that could result in such Fed behavior include menu-cost type of models or
models with the Fed as a strategic player using the target changes as signals of its policy stance.
15With c0 = ￿1; and, cJ = 1
12changes will actually take place.
2.1 The Multiple Integral Problem
The obvious way to estimate the model of equations (2) and (3) is, as with all limited dependent vari-
able models, maximum likelihood estimation. The likelihood (conditional on e XT, the explanatory
variables for periods 1;:::;T) is the probability of the joint T-period event that has been observed,
given e XT:
Pr[￿ff1 2 category j1;￿ff2 2 category j2;:::;￿ffT 2 category jT j e XT]:16
Thus, this likelihood is a T-dimensional multiple integral with a T-variate Gaussian density as its
integrand. The multiple integral problem arises in this context because, in contrast to standard
linear autoregressive models, the Markov property does not hold here: The essential feature of
linear time series that makes conditional maximum likelihood estimation (whereby the likelihood of
the complete sample can be usefully expressed as a product of conditional likelihoods and of the
density of the ￿rst observation17) easy is its Markov structure; that is, say for an AR(1), the period-t
distribution conditional on period t ￿ 1, does not depend on any other periods before period t ￿ 1.
This unfortunately is no longer true in our nonlinear context.
For example, let ￿t denote the period t information set (that is de￿ned to include the explanatory
variables up to period t,18 and the observed dependent variable up to period t ￿ 1).
Then, the conditional event probability for period t (given ￿t) is:
Pr[￿fft 2 category j j￿t] = Pr[ff￿
t ￿ fft￿1 2 (cj￿1;cj) j￿t] (4)
= Pr[cj￿1 + fft￿1 < ff￿
t < cj + fft￿1 j￿t] ; j = 1;:::;J ; t = 1;:::;T:
16j1;:::;jT denote the categories in which ￿ff1;:::;￿ffT actually fell in periods 1;:::;T:
17See Hamilton (1994, Chapter 5) for a de￿nition and discussion of conditional maximum likelihood of linear time
series models.
18Or, alternatively, it can be de￿ned to include the explanatory variables for all periods up to T:
13Solving equation (2)19 by backward substitution20, we have that:
ff￿
t = ￿t + ￿t + ￿tff￿
0 + ￿t; (5)
where ￿t is a sum of constants, ￿t is also a sum containing lags of the explanatory variables, ￿t is
a function of the coe¢ cients of ￿(L), ff￿
0 is the dependent variable for the initial period, and ￿t
is a sum containing the error terms multiplied by the coe¢ cients of ￿(L). Now we can rewrite the
period-t conditional event probabilities for j = 1;:::;J, by plugging (5) into (4):
Pr[￿fft 2 category j j￿t] (6)
= Pr[cj￿1 + fft￿1 < ￿t + ￿t + ￿tff￿
0 + ￿t < cj + fft￿1 j￿t]
= Pr[cj￿1 + fft￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿tff￿
0 < ￿t < cj + fft￿1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿tff￿
0 j￿t]:
Inspecting equation (6), we can gain some more intuition on the multiple integral problem, that
arises in this context and that greatly complicates the estimation task.
While ￿t does satisfy the Markov property, ￿fft does not. As we can see from equation (6) the
conditional period-t event probability that ￿fft 2 category j explicitly depends not only on ￿fft￿1,
but on information from all previous periods as well. Indeed, and while we need only the conditional
distribution of ￿t given ￿t for the probability of equation (6), the Markov structure of ￿t does not
help much with this problem. The information set ￿t includes values of the observed dependent
variable up to period t ￿ 1. However, ￿fft￿1 places bounds only on ￿t￿1 (because of equation
(3)), but does not pin it down completely, and thus all the past history of the dependent variable
contains additional useful information regarding ￿t￿1. That is, the t-period event probability is still
a t-dimensional multiple integral even when this probability is conditioned on ￿t. And, as the error
terms are Gaussian, these multiple integrals have multinomial Gaussian pdf￿ s as their integrands,
19For expositional simplicity I consider the case of Equation (2) with one lag only.
20Writing the latent equation in levels is a useful expositional device that Eichengreen et al (1985) adopt to illustrate
the multiple integral problem. Here I adapt their approach to the context of this study.
14and thus there is no closed-form solution for such multiple integrals.
To further see the intuition behind this, let us consider an example: Let￿ s say the Fed raised the
policy instrument in period t-1. While ff￿
t￿1 is not explicitly revealed by this action, it is likely to
be at the lower end of its possible values implied by the new category in which it now falls (equation
(3)). This, of course, reduces the probability of a further increase of the policy instrument in period
t, and must thus be taken into account when assessing the probability of a further increase in period
t. Thus, it is essentially the entire history (all the periods) that must be taken into account when
assessing these probabilities, precisely because the lagged latent variable is not observable.
Thus, the question that arises is how to proceed with estimation when faced with a likelihood
that contains multiple integrals of such high-dimensionalities.
Standard numerical integration techniques, such as Gaussian quadrature, can e⁄ectively handle
only up to four or ￿ve multiple integrals, and thus are essentially not feasible for multiple integral
dimensionalities such as the ones of the present context. An early notable attempt to tackle the mul-
tiple integral problem is Eichengreen et al. (1985) who however introduce discrete approximations
of the multiple integrals and face a rather steep trade-o⁄ in terms of accuracy versus computational
cost.
Classical and Bayesian simulation techniques that have been developed recently greatly dominate
such numerical approaches (in terms of their computational costs, accuracy, and in terms of their
potential to handle modeling of complicated dynamics) and have thus become by far the dominant
approach in recent literature.
One in￿ uential approach is that of the simulation-assisted extremum estimation techniques such
as the Methods of Simulated Likelihood, Moments, or Scores that have been developed in the mi-
croeconometrics literature (see, inter alia, Lerman and Manski (1981), McFadden (1989), Pakes and
Pollard (1989), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998) ). Simulators, such as the frequency simulator
of Lerman and Manski (1981), or the GHK simulator developed by Geweke (1991), Hajivassiliou
(1990) and Keane (1994) are used to estimate the multiple integrals, and thus to obtain simu-
15lated objective functions21, which, in conjunction with numerical optimization techniques, provide
a framework that can deliver estimates of the parameters of interest. However, these methods have
been employed so far mostly in micro contexts22, where the dimensionality of the multiple integrals
is typically smaller than in time series contexts. Indeed, the computational costs associated with the
required simulations, combined with similar costs of the needed numerical optimization techniques
can render them impractical, or even infeasible in time series contexts such as the one of this paper.
Thus, the approach that this paper proposes is an MCMC approach that overcomes the mul-
tiple integral problem through a Gibbs sampling algorithm with data augmentation, whereby sim-
ulated samples of the latent variables ff￿
t ;t = 1;:::;T, are generated through their model-implied
conditional distributions. This approach also avoids the additional complications associated with
numerical optimization, as it falls outside the extremum framework. Finally, an important addi-
tional advantage of the MCMC approach is its ￿ exibility: The block structure of MCMC implies
that additional time series features such as Time Varying Parameters, or Regime Switching can
be readily incorporated into the benchmark model, whereas attempting something similar in an
extremum framework is likely to be substantially more cumbersome. The speci￿cs of the MCMC
approach used in this paper are described next.
2.2 The MCMC Estimation Strategy
Let ￿ denote the parameter vector, that in the context of the benchmark speci￿cation is taken to
include the coe¢ cients of the explanatory variables, the variance, and the latent variables. Let
21The frequency simulator exploits the fact that the event probabilities can be viewed as expectations of indicator
functions, and thus employs accept-reject types of algorithms to construct estimates of such expectations. Speci￿cally,
and in the present context, we have that the likelihood can be written as follows:
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function that is 1 if T-dimensional ￿ falls within the T-period limits of integration, and 0 otherwise. So, E(I(￿)) can be







I(￿r): However, and as is evident from the above expression,
the frequency simulator is computationally ine¢ cient, especially for low event probabilities, and it is a jump-function
of the parameters. It is dominated by other simulators that have been developed recently, and in particular by the
GHK simulator, which provides a feasible framework for simulating multiple integrals by transforming the task of
sampling from multivariate truncated distributions (that is required to simulate the multiple integrals) to one of
sequentially sampling from conditional univariate truncated distributions (that can be easily performed through the
inversion of the cdf￿ s of these truncated univariate distributions).
22One of the very few exceptions is Lee (1999).
16pT(￿) denote the posterior distribution of the parameter vector. MCMC techniques are in general
designed to generate simulated samples that are approximately distributed from pT(￿), without
directly drawing these samples from pT(￿) per se. The speci￿c MCMC technique used in this paper
is the Gibbs sampler: It is particularly suitable in contexts such as the present one, where evaluating
the entire joint posterior distribution of the parameters at any given point of the support space may
be very hard (in the present context, that posterior distribution is proportional to the likelihood,
which, as analyzed above, contains high-dimensional multiple integrals), but where it is easy to
sample from marginal and joint conditional posterior distributions of subsets (or blocks) of the
parameter vector, because of simpli￿cations that occur in these conditional posteriors.
The simulated sample that is produced by the Gibbs sampler constitutes an ergodic Markov
Chain, whose stationary distribution is pT(￿). In other words, it is a Markov Chain that converges
to an invariant distribution (pT(￿)) independently of the initial conditions used to initiate the
chain. Thus, and after a "large enough" number of simulations, that is, after a certain number of
pre-convergence "burn-in" draws have been discarded, a sample of simulated values can be created,
and the joint and marginal posterior distributions of the parameters can be approximated by the
respective joint and marginal empirical distributions of these simulated values.
The ergodicity property is central as it ensures that the initial conditions which are typically ar-
bitrary have no e⁄ect on the results, and it also serves as a useful tool to assess whether convergence
has been achieved or not: If the results change when the Gibbs sampler is initiated from di⁄erent
starting points, then this typically implies that convergence has not been achieved. MCMC conver-
gence diagnostics is in general an active research area, and various approaches have been proposed
in the literature23. The approach adopted here is similar to that of McCulloch and Rossi (1994),
whereby the empirical distributions of the simulated values are compared when the Gibbs sampler
is initiated from di⁄erent starting points, and as the number of simulations increases, looking for
evidence of non-trivial changes in these distributions.
Once convergence has been established according to the criteria just outlined, statistics based
23Robert and Casella (1999), Chib (2001), and Geweke and Keane (2001) are some of the excellent sources for more
information on MCMC convergence diagnostics, as well as on MCMC theory.
17on the simulated sample can be constructed and can serve as estimators of the parameters of inter-
est. An important additional computational advantage of this approach is that it falls outside the
extremum context, and thus no costly numerical optimizations are required to obtain the estimates.
In the following sections, the estimates of the parameters of interest are the means of their simu-
lated marginal posterior distributions, and con￿dence intervals are constructed using the quantiles
of these posterior distributions24.
Note that, while MCMC techniques in general, and the Gibbs sampler in particular are encoun-
tered almost always in Bayesian contexts in the literature, this paper adopts a classical perspective.
The estimator just described is a Bayes estimator. Under suitable regularity conditions and as the
sample size increases, the likelihood overwhelms the priors, whose e⁄ect thus fades away, and thus
the Bayes estimator, viewed from a sampling perspective, is asymptotically e¢ cient. The intuition
for this is very much in the tradition of Laplace, who observed that posterior distributions start to
look increasingly like Gaussian distributions as the sample size grows. Bernstein (1917) and von
Mises (1931) are early contributions that formalized Laplace￿ s intuition. More recent contributions,
such as Lehmann and Casella (1998), derive the asymptotic e¢ ciency of Bayes estimators under an
appropriate set of conditions. Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) generalize past results of the litera-
ture as they propose a class of estimators (which they call Laplace type estimators) which use general
statistical criterion functions that include parametric likelihood functions (that past literature has
mostly focused on) as special cases. Monokroussos (2004) specializes the theory to the particular
class of Limited Dependent Variable models of Time Series (that inlcudes the ordered probit of this
study as a special case), and also examines the small sample biases associated with such estimators.
Stated succintly, and for the present context, the proposed estimator provides a feasible way to
estimate probits of time series, and is also asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood
estimator.
Previous work that employs Gibbs sampling techniques for Limited Dependent Variable and
Time Series models includes Albert and Chib (1993a,b) and Dueker (1999b). The speci￿cs of the
24As Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) and Monokroussos (2004) discuss, the asymptotic validity of such con￿dence
intervals for the present context is based on the fact that the Information Equality holds in this context.
18Gibbs sampling algorithm that is used here for the benchmark model are as follows.
Divide the set of parameters into a multi-block setup of one block per latent variable, ￿1t =
fff￿
t g;t = 1;:::;T, one block for the variance, ￿2 = f￿2g, and one block for the coe¢ cients of the
explanatory variables, ￿3 = f￿;￿;￿;￿1;:::￿ng. Then:






3 , and set i = 0:
























































where YT denotes the entire history of the data for periods 1;:::;T, and superscript i indicates the
iteration of the Gibbs sampler. This choice of blocks is dictated by the fact that the resulting con-
ditional posteriors are easy to sample from, and the Appendix provides the distributional details of
these posteriors, and also other details of the Gibbs sampler, including robustness checks performed
using di⁄erent priors.
The multi-block setup of one block per latent variable is employed to implement the technique
of data augmentation, introduced by Tanner and Wong (1987), whereby the latent variables are
generated from their model implied conditional distributions pff￿
1;:::;pff￿
T. Note that these distri-
butions are conditioned on the entire history of the data and thus that a smoothing algorithm is
required. The standard way to approach a problem of this sort is with a state-space framework and
using the Kalman ￿lter; however, it is unclear how to usefully cast the system in a state-space form
19so as to employ the Kalman ￿lter in this context25. I thus implement the smoothing algorithm for
the latent variables by exploiting simpli￿cations that occur in the conditional distributions of these
latent variables, and then observing that functional forms for these simpli￿ed conditional distribu-
tions can be obtained from the joint distribution of all the error terms where each latent variable
appears. This smoothing algorithm for the latent variables is derived in the Appendix.
3 Data
The dependent variable is the Fed￿ s policy instrument and the explanatory variables are, in addition
to lags of the Fed￿ s policy instrument, real-time forecasts of in￿ ation and of the output gap. The
data series used span the period from January of 1969 to June of 199826. The rest of this section
provides details on these time series:
The Fed￿ s Policy Instrument
The Fed￿ s policy instrument is typically assumed to be the federal funds rate. This is the working
assumption of most of the applied work on reaction functions and is in line with the prescriptions
of past literature (such as Goodfriend (1991), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) ). However, and while the literature has mostly focused on choosing a variable that is a
su¢ cient indicator of monetary policy and has largely settled on the federal funds rate as being the
best choice, it has generally neglected27 the issue of characterizing the speci￿cs of its time series
behavior:
The Fed announces periodically (usually during FOMC meetings, but occasionally in between
FOMC meetings too) a target for the federal funds rate. These announcements are eagerly antici-
pated and closely scrutinized by the ￿nancial markets internationally, precisely because it is these
announcements and the associated movements in the target that are understood to be the best,
25Note that the obvious choice, namely, for the transition equation to be the latent equation (2) and for the
measurement equation to be equation (3) is not feasible because equation (3) is not linear.
26Greenbook forecasts (which are used for the construction of the explanatory variables) are made available to the
public with a 5 year lag.
27With only a few exceptions, such as Hamilton and Jord￿ (2002), and Dueker (1999a).
20most direct indicators of the U.S. monetary authority￿ s policy stance. As argued earlier, however,
the target moves at discrete points in time only, and its movements fall into one out of a small pos-
sible number of speci￿c categories of change. This pattern is largely preserved even when periodic
averages of the fed funds rate are considered, as it is the task of the trading desk of the New York
Fed to ensure that the fed funds rate never deviates much from the target at any point in time.
Thus, an ordered probit reaction function such as the one given by equations (2) and (3),
estimated using the time series of the changes of the policy instrument as the dependent variable,
is better suited to capture the discreteness of the policy instrument.
However, the time series on the target and on its changes are not available for the entire period
considered in this study, and not for the early part of the sample in particular. The Fed began to
announce the target explicitly only in 1994, although, even before 1994 changes in the target were
quite accurately inferred by the market and indeed news on such changes would even be published
in the ￿nancial press. Researchers have used such historical information to compile time series of
target changes for periods prior to 1994 (such as Cook and Hahn (1989) for the mid and late1970￿ s
and Rudebusch (1995) for the mid-1980￿ s and later), but there is no complete such series for the
entire period considered in this study.
Thus, the dependent variable that I use is the (annualized) averages of the fed funds rate at the
"FOMC frequency", that is, monthly averages for the months during which there was an FOMC
meeting28. These averages, for which there is a complete series for the period of interest, can thus
be viewed as proxying for averages of the target. One would expect, given that the Fed ensures
that the fed funds rate never deviates too much from the set target at any given period, that the
loss from such a strategy is only minimal. Indeed, and as Figure 2 (which maps monthly averages
of the fed funds rate against monthly averages of the target for the Greenspan period) illustrates,
the fed funds rate tracks the target quite closely29. Additional evidence to this is provided in Table
28The choice of frequency is dictated by the explanatory variables: In particular the Greenbook forecasts (from
which the explanatory variables are constructed) are available only for the months during which there was an FOMC
meeting.
29This can essentially be considered to be a case of measurement error in the dependent variable. Such error in
the dependent variable in the ordered probit context may not be as innocuous as it would be in a linear context
though because of the possibility that the measurement error "pushes" the discrete dependent variable into a di⁄erent
211, which contains estimates of the benchmark reaction function for the Greenspan period using
the monthly averages for the fed funds rate; these estimates are quite similar to their respective
estimates obtained when using the target as the dependent variable, either as averages at the FOMC
frequency, or as end-of-month values for months during which there was an FOMC meeting.
Real-time data on Fed forecasts of in￿ation and of the output gap
The data used are real-time Greenbook forecasts of the Federal Reserve for the GDP de￿ ator and
for unemployment. The Greenbooks and the forecasts contained therein are prepared by sta⁄
of the Federal Reserve before each Federal Open Markets Committee meeting, and thus contain
estimates based on real-time information. The forecasts are for varying forecast horizons, but only
short horizons are consistently available - in this study I use three-quarter-ahead forecasts for the
benchmark speci￿cation, but I also conduct robustness checks using data for zero, one and two
quarters ahead.
The in￿ ation variable used is based on the GDP de￿ ator (up to October of 1991) and the GNP
de￿ ator after that date30. Also, and following past literature, such as Boivin (2004), and Orphanides
(2002), I construct a proxy for the output gap variable using forecasts for unemployment, and
speci￿cally, I take the output gap at time t to be proxied by the di⁄erence between the natural
unemployment rate (the time t natural rate of unemployment is taken to be the historical average
of the unemployment series up to that point) and the forecast for the unemployment rate31 at time
t.32
category than the one it would otherwise fall into. However, and conversely, if this change of categories never happens,
or happens only rarely, as is the case with the Greenspan sample I considered, then there will be little cost associated
with such measurement error.
30This is dictated by the availability of these variables, as GNP de￿ ator data replace GDP de￿ ator data in the
Greenbooks starting October, 1991, and it is likely to have only a neglligible e⁄ect on the results.
31This is standard practice in the literature and indeed Okun￿ s Law guarantees that there is a close relationship
between this "unemployment gap" proxy and the output gap.
32I also conducted robustness checks using the alternative measure of real output gap of Orphanides (2004): There
are two problems with using the Orphanides data set in the present context, however: First, the quarterly frequency of
that data set, as opposed to the "FOMC frequency" of the data set used in this study, is likely to confound variations
in the changes of the policy instrument by bundling together successive and distinct such changes. Second, a complete
series is available only starting with the 3rd quarter of 1973. This is likely to further compromise the validity of the
results in the pre-Volcker period (which ends in 1979) as the 1973-1979 sample, (with a quarterly frequency), may
be too short to identify the slope coe¢ cients of the reaction function. The results using the Orphanides data set are
quite similar to the results of the rest of this study for the Volcker-Greenspan period. For the pre-Volcker period, the
22The real-time nature of these forecasts is in line with prescriptions of recent literature (see, inter
alia, Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2004) ) according to which reaction functions ought to be estimated
using data that were available to Fed policy makers at the time their decisions were made, if a
meaningful historical analysis of policy is to be made. Estimating these functions with revised data,
which were only available typically much later than in real time, can seriously confound important
aspects of the policy making process, especially when, as is often the case, the revised series di⁄er
substantially from their real-time counterparts.
The use of forecasts results in a forward-looking reaction function, which is arguably a more
realistic speci￿cation in the face of lags that are generally thought to be present in the monetary
transmission mechanism, and it also encompasses backward looking speci￿cations, in the sense that
it is likely that the Fed, when constructing its forecasts, has a broad information set that includes
the variables used in a backward looking speci￿cation.
However, this approach is not free of pitfalls. In particular, there isn￿ t much detailed information
in the public domain regarding how these Greenbook forecasts are constructed, and it is likely that
quantitative methods are employed, and that there is also a strong judgmental component. Also,
and as Boivin (2004) argues, it is likely that most of these are conditional forecasts, with one of the
conditioning assumptions being that the federal funds rate will remain unchanged over the horizon
that the forecast spans. This is of course a restrictive assumption as it is unlikely that the FOMC
considers forecasts based only on this particular scenario (that the fed funds rate will not change in
the near future), and thus it may compromise the validity of estimates of forward-looking reaction
functions that use such Greenbook forecasts.
Thus, and while this may be an imperfect approach, it is not clear that a popular alternative
that has been proposed in the literature (and which is the approach that CGG adopt) is preferable:
That alternative approach treats the expectations of a standard forward looking reaction function,
such as equation (20) below:
results obtained using the Orphanides quarterly data for the 1973-1979 period di⁄er from the results of this study for
the 1969-1979 period (at the FOMC frequency).
23ff￿
t = ￿ + ￿(L)ff￿
t￿1 + ￿E[￿t;hj￿t] + ￿E[y
gap
t;h j￿t], (20)
as unobservable, and thus replaces them with the realizations of the in￿ ation and output gap vari-
ables, and it relies on a rational expectations assumption to derive a set of orthogonality conditions
between the resulting error term and ￿t; the information set of the Fed at time t. These orthog-
onality conditions can then be exploited for estimation using a Generalized Method of Moments
approach, with instruments drawn from the Fed￿ s information set. However, recent work (such as
Mavroeidis (2002, 2004) ) has shown that this strategy is plagued by weak identi￿cation problems,
associated with the unrealistic assumption of lack of feedback (which of course is a problem with
the Greenbook forecast approach too), and also with the instruments actually used for the GMM
estimation being weak.
4 Estimation Results and Discussion
The benchmark model is equations (2) and (3). It is assumed that there are 5 categories of change for
the observed variable, namely a no change category, a small change (positive or negative) category,
and a bigger change (positive or negative) category. While it might be possible to create an algorithm
that endogenizes the number of categories, there seems to be little loss from this assumption of 5
categories of change in the present context: One realizes, simply by observing the actual time series
of target changes that there have been no changes in the target33 for roughly half of the time, and
for the other half of the time there have been either small changes in the target, or bigger changes,
that is, changes whose magnitude has been greater than one times 25 basis points after 1989, and
greater than three times 6.25 basis points before 1989.
Thus the benchmark speci￿cation is one with these 5 categories of change, and with the threshold
coe¢ cients being ￿18;￿5;5; and 18 basis points. Thus, and for example, the "no-change" category
is the one where the change in the observed variable is between ￿5 and 5 basis points. While
33Or almost no changes when FOMC-monthly averages of the fed funds rate are used.
24there might be little loss associated with exogenously imposing a number of categories of change
in the present context, the same is not necessarily true with exogenously imposing the threshold
values that de￿ne these categories. Thus, the following section reports results from performing
robustness checks on the threshold values and also on attempts to estimate such threshold values
(by augmenting the Gibbs sampler for the benchmark model with additional blocks from which the
threshold coe¢ cients are generated).
The forecast horizon that the benchmark speci￿cation assumes is h = 3 quarters ahead. This
is consistent with current practices in the forward-looking reaction function literature34, but I also
consider alternative speci￿cations with di⁄erent forecast horizons in the following section.
The results for the benchmark model are reported in Tables 2 and 3. These tables contain panels
with quantiles and statistics of the posterior distributions of the parameters of interest corresponding
to di⁄erent numbers of iterations of the Gibbs sampler35. Several panels such as those of Table 2,
together with their respective histograms of the posterior distributions, such as those Figures 3A
and 3B36, are produced for di⁄erent starting values that initiate the Gibbs sampler and for di⁄erent
numbers of iterations of the sampler, and they are compared and evidence of any substantial changes
in the results is sought for. For all the results reported in this study, the results change very little as
di⁄erent starting values and di⁄erent numbers of iterations are considered. This serves as evidence
of convergence, at least according to the criteria outlined in the previous section.
Table 2 provides the results for the benchmark model and for one lag of the latent dependent
variable, and Table 3 provides the results for the benchmark model with 2 lags (with the second
lag being insigni￿cant37). The results from both of these tables are similar and they point towards
34See Boivin (2004) and Orphanides (2004).
35The results reported here are based on 1300 iterations, with 300 "burn-in" states, as all the available evidence
in various experiments I conducted showed that this was a su¢ cient number of iterations (based on the criteria that
are used in this study to established convergence (that were outlined earlier), and also based on experiments and
comparisons with higher numbers of iterations).
36The ￿gures are based on all the iterations and provide a more complete picture of the marginal distributions.
These ￿gures are plain histograms; no nonparametric techniques for selecting the bandwidth have been employed.
Our main focus when examining these ￿gures is to look for evidence of more than one modes; thus our goal is to
preserve the rough shape of the density, minimizing biases; the side e⁄ect of that is that our graphs are too wiggly;
thus, these wiggles and spikes are just a result of the way the histograms are generated.
37The two-lag speci￿cation is the one used by Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000)
25substantial di⁄erences in monetary policy between the two periods before and after Paul Volcker￿ s
appointment as chairman of the Fed in August of 1979:
Speci￿cally, the pre-Volcker period (which, for the sample considered in this study covers the
last two years of Martin￿ s tenure, Burns￿ s tenure in the 1970￿ s, and Miller￿ s tenure as Chairman
of the Fed from March of 1978 to August of 1979) is characterized by a weak overall response to
in￿ ation: For instance, for the speci￿cation with one lag, the in￿ ation coe¢ cient is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from 0, and the implied long-run in￿ ation coe¢ cient is
￿
1￿￿1 = 0:0682
1￿0:8664 = 0:51048. This
is well below 1 and thus does not satisfy the Taylor property; it suggests that the pre-Volcker Fed
"accommodated" in￿ ation, as it would raise the nominal interest rate by less than increases in
expected in￿ ation, thus e⁄ectively allowing the real short-term interest rate to decline.
These results contrast starkly, however, with the estimated response of the Fed towards in￿ ation
during the Volcker-Greenspan era. For the 1 lag speci￿cation again, the in￿ ation coe¢ cient is
substantially higher than before and is now signi￿cant, and the implied long-run in￿ ation coe¢ cient
is now 0:4518
1￿0:7679 = 1:9466, which suggests that the Volcker-Greenspan Fed adopted a very strong
anti-in￿ ationary stance, as it would substantially raise both the nominal and the real interest rate
in response to increases in anticipated in￿ ation.
Quite clearly, these ￿ndings con￿rm the central message of CGG that there were substantial
di⁄erences in the Fed￿ s response towards expected in￿ ation between the two periods. These results
are thus compatible with CGG￿ s theory that the pre-Volcker￿ s Fed accommodative policy stance
was destabilizing, as it allowed for the possibility of expectations-based in￿ ationary spirals, and
also as it was less e⁄ective in countering negative shocks to the economy, and that the dramatic
shift towards a much stronger anti-in￿ ationary stance of the Fed that took place when Paul Volcker
became chairman of the Fed was a central factor behind the improved macroeconomic outcomes
and the greater stability of the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s.
Conversely, and as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, the coe¢ cient of the output gap was low
(0:1144 in the 1-lag speci￿cation of Table 2) and insigni￿cant during the Volcker-Greenspan period,
and substantially higher (0:3006 in the 1-lag speci￿cation) and signi￿cant during the pre-Volcker
26period. Thus, and on the basis of these results, it can be argued that the Fed e⁄ectively pursued
a pure in￿ ation targeting policy during the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s, while it was much more responsive
towards the output gap during the pre-Volcker period.
Given that the data used for the construction of the output gap variable are real-time Greenbook
forecasts on unemployment, and since, as demonstrated by Orphanides (2002), estimates of the
output gap based on Greenbook data on unemployment are upwardly biased, the results of Tables
2 and 3 on the coe¢ cient of the output gap are consistent with the explanation put forth by
Orphanides in his recent papers (Orphanides (2002, 2004) ). Orphanides argues that the main
di⁄erence between the two periods before and after Volcker￿ s appointment is that the pre-Volcker Fed
was essentially too activist in its response to real-time output gap estimates that ex-post proved to be
overambitious, and thus that this excessive activism of the pre-Volcker Fed contributed to the poor
macroeconomic outcomes and the Great In￿ ation of the 1970￿ s. Following Volcker￿ s appointment
the Fed adopted a more cautious approach towards possibly inaccurate real-time estimates of the
output gap and in general a more realistic stance in the sense that it better recognized the limitations
of monetary policy in attempting to achieve output stabilization. However, and in contrast to CGG,
Orphanides ￿nds that the Fed had a strong anti-in￿ ationary stance both in the 1960￿ s and 1970￿ s
and later.
Both CGG and Orphanides essentially adopt a "policy mistakes"38 view to explain the Great
In￿ ation and the contrast in macroeconomic performance between the 1970￿ s and the 1980￿ s-1990￿ s
in that they argue that the pre-Volcker Fed made mistakes in its conduct of monetary policy, and
that starting with Volcker￿ s appointment the Fed to a large extent avoided mistaken practices of
the past. CGG and Orphanides di⁄er, however, in terms of their assessments on what these policy
mistakes were.
The results presented here provide further evidence for such a policy mistakes view in terms
of both the in￿ ation and the output gap variables. They are thus compatible with more tightly
parameterized approaches, such as learning models in which the monetary authority initially has
38The terms "policy mistakes view" and "bad luck view" that follows are taken from Primiceri (2004).
27wrong perceptions in real time about both the output gap and the output-in￿ ation trade-o⁄ and
eventually corrects such misperceptions.
The results of the benchmark model are not necessarily inconsistent however with alternative
explanations such as the "bad luck" view that focuses on the role of unfavorable non-policy shocks
in the 1970￿ s, or a more gradualist approach that would argue that any policy changes were more
gradual than the stark contrast described by CGG. Thus the section that follows takes up the task
of investigating to what extent the main results of the benchmark model stand when extensions of
this sort and other robustness checks are considered.
5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
Various robustness checks and extensions are considered in this section, and the main results and
conclusions obtained from the estimation of the benchmark model of the previous section are mostly
preserved in all of these exercises. The results that follow are obtained from estimates of the bench-
mark model using di⁄erent forecast horizons, di⁄erent threshold values that de￿ne the categories
of change of the observed dependent variable, and also, from an extension of the benchmark model
that allows for modeling of possible heteroskedasticity, and an additional extension that allows for
time-varying parameters. The rest of this section considers each of these robustness checks and
extensions in turn:
5.1 Di⁄erent forecast horizons
The forward-looking speci￿cation for the latent equation of the benchmark model (equation (2) ) is
too restrictive in that it assumes that the Fed￿ s responses to forecasts of in￿ ation and of the output
gap are independent of the forecast horizon. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption as the Fed
realizes that a change in its policy instrument at any given point in time will have di⁄erent e⁄ects
on the macroeconomy at di⁄erent points in the future. Indeed, a more realistic depiction of the
Fed￿ s forward-looking behavior results if we replace equation (2) by the following:
28ff￿
t = ￿ + ￿(L)ff￿




with ￿h and ￿h varying with the forecast horizon h.
Similarly, and given that actual Greenbook forecasts are used in the estimation, and since,
as discussed earlier, Greenbook forecasts are often conditioned on particular paths of the policy
instrument (such as a path of no change for the policy instrument), and that the monetary policy
makers are unlikely to consider single-scenario conditional forecasts when reaching their policy
decisions, it is likely that this is a misspeci￿ed framework, with the e⁄ects of such misspeci￿cations
varying with the forecast horizon.
Thus, and as the choice of the forecast horizon for the benchmark model was arbitrary, it is
essential to consider how the results obtained using the benchmark speci￿cation (that assumes a
forecast horizon of h = 3 quarters ahead) compare to those of alternative speci￿cations with di⁄erent
forecast horizons. I conducted experiments using Greenbook forecasts on h = 0;1;2 quarters ahead39
and I report the results in Table 4. The results are similar to those obtained with the 3-quarter
ahead forecast horizon (although the in￿ ation coe¢ cient tends to be somewhat more signi￿cant
with these alternative speci￿cations than with the benchmark speci￿cation during the pre-Volcker
era) and all the conclusions from above remain unchanged.
5.2 Threshold coe¢ cients and identi￿cation
The estimation of the benchmark model is done with the threshold coe¢ cients being set to arbitrary
values, rather than being estimated, and the obvious concern here is that the results may be a⁄ected
by the choice of values for the threshold coe¢ cients. It is in principle possible to estimate the
threshold coe¢ cients of equation (3) by augmenting the Gibbs sampler for the benchmark model
with appropriate additional blocks, and the Appendix illustrates how this is done. However, such
estimation attempts are plagued by identi￿cation problems.
39The Greenbooks occasionally provide forecasts for longer forecast horizons too. However, and starting with 4
quarters ahead, there are too many gaps in these time series.
29First of all, a setup where all the threshold coe¢ cients, together with all the other parameters,
are all being freely estimated, is not identi￿ed, as we have an intercept in our model: Adding a
constant to all three sides of the double inequality giving the conditional event probability (equation
(4)) will not change that event probability, and thus the likelihood will not change either. Indeed,
a simple inspection of the histograms of the posterior distributions associated with such estimation
attempts strongly suggest lack of identi￿cation as there is clear evidence of lack of convergence of
the Gibbs sampler and of multimodality in the conditional posterior distributions for the threshold
coe¢ cients.
Fixing one of the threshold coe¢ cients addresses the identi￿cation issue in a strict sense, but
the evidence I get from performing the usual convergence diagnostics checks and from examining
the histograms of the posterior distributions is that nevertheless there isn￿ t improvement from the
previous case. This suggests that weak identi￿cation of the threshold coe¢ cients is an important
factor in our context. This sounds quite intuitive too: For instance, altering the threshold coe¢ cients
mildly is unlikely to change the event probabilities, and thus the likelihood, substantially.
Thus there seems to be little loss associated with ￿xing the threshold coe¢ cients at some reason-
able values. As mentioned earlier, the values used in the benchmark speci￿cation are: ￿18;￿5;5;
and 18 basis points. There is clearly very little loss associated with ￿5;5: These numbers are wide
enough so as to capture the no-change category when the series used is the monthly averages of the
e⁄ective fed funds rate and they are also too small for the small-change categories (any changes in
the target have historically come in multiples of 6.25 or 25 basis points). However, the same may
not be true for the numbers chosen to divide the small change and bigger change categories in the
benchmark speci￿cation, namely ￿18;18; for instance, there have been several target changes that
took place before 1989 and that were equal to ￿18:75 basis points. Thus I examine the robustness
of the results when these numbers are altered by re-estimating the benchmark speci￿cation using
￿25 instead of ￿18 basis points to divide the categories of small change and of bigger change. The
results from this experiment are reported in Table 5 and are very similar to those of the benchmark
speci￿cation.
305.3 Modeling heteroskedasticity
An in￿ uential alternative, and to some extent, competing view that has been developed recently in
the literature40 argues that it was exogenous, non-policy shocks, whose volatility was higher in the
1970￿ s than in the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s, that were the main cause of the Great In￿ ation and of the con-
trast in macroeconomic performance between the pre-Volcker and the Volcker-Greenspan periods.
In view of this, it is important to test the robustness of the results obtained with the benchmark
model when this is embedded in a richer framework, that allows for possible heteroskedasticity.
I allow for such potential heteroskedasticity by using a two state regime switching framework
for the variances41. Speci￿cally, the model that I estimate is the same as the benchmark model
with the latent equation now being as follows:
ff￿
t = ￿ + ￿(L)ff￿











0(1 ￿ St) + ￿2
1St = ￿2
0(1 + h1St) , with ￿2
1 = ￿2
0(1 + h1);
where St is a hidden Bernoulli random variable with the following transition probabilities:
Pr[St = 0jSt￿1 = 0] = q ; Pr[St = 1jSt￿1 = 1] = p:
I also assume that p;q 2 (0;1), which ensures that neither state is transient42. Furthermore
I assume that h1 > 0. This is a convenient normalization condition that deals with the "label
40See, inter alia, Kim and Nelson (1999b), Sims (1999), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Stock and Watson (2003),
and Sims and Zha (2004).
41See Hamilton (1989, 1994).
42This assumption is required for identi￿cation, since if St = 0, for all t, or if St = 1 for all t, then the two separate
variances are not identi￿ed.
31switching" issue that is present in mixture models43.
The Gibbs sampler that is used for this model is that of the benchmark model that is augmented




￿41;:::;T = fStg;t = 1;:::;T
￿50;￿5
00 = fp;qg
The smoothing algorithm that is used for the generation of the state variables is based on a
combination of a multi-move Gibbs sampling step and Hamilton￿ s (Hamilton (1989) ) ￿lter. The
speci￿cs of this algorithm and of the rest of the Gibbs sampler for the regime switching model are
provided in the Appendix.
The results are provided in Table 6, and they are quite similar to those of the benchmark model.
The main ￿nding of a stark, dramatic contrast in US monetary policy between the pre-Volcker and
the Volcker-Greenspan periods receives at least as much support as with the benchmark model.
Interestingly, and as the two ￿gures associated with Table 6 illustrate, we are in the low-volatility
state for the majority of the time in the pre-Volcker period, and we are in the low-volatility state
almost all the time in the Volcker-Greenspan period.
While it would be useful to consider speci￿cations that allow for richer dynamics too, such as,
for instance, a regime framework for the second moments with a higher number of states, the results
obtained with this model serve at least as an indication that heteroskedasticity is not a major factor
in this context.
43See Hamilton et al. (2003) for further details.
44The ￿20;￿200 blocks replace ￿2.
325.4 Time Varying Parameters
An interesting extension to the standard reaction function literature has been proposed by, inter
alia, Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2002), Boivin (2004), and Jalil (2004). According to this approach,
there may have been richer dynamics in US monetary policy than what can be captured by a simple
split-sample strategy such as that of CGG, and also, policy changes may have been slower and
more gradual than the split-sample approach can uncover. Thus, these authors, motivated by such
considerations, estimate reaction functions with Time Varying Parameters.
As the benchmark model of this study is estimated within a split sample framework, it would
be interesting to see if the results and conclusions from the estimation of the benchmark model are
preserved when Time Varying Parameters are considered. Thus, the TVP version of the benchmark
model is equation (3) and a TVP version of equation (2):
ff￿
t = ￿t + ￿t(L)ff￿




Following the authors mentioned above, I model the Time Varying Parameters as driftless ran-
dom walks.
So, let ￿t be a (n + 3) ￿ 1 vector: ￿t = [￿t ￿1t :::￿nt ￿t ￿t]0. Then:




t!is) = 0; for all t;s = 1;:::;T, and i = 1;:::;n+3. Furthermore the driftless random
walks for the coe¢ cients of the lags of the dependent variable are subject to re￿ecting barriers that
ensure that the roots of the polynomial 1 ￿ ￿1tL ￿ ￿2tL2 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿ntLn lie outside the unit circle45.
The estimation of this model is achieved by augmenting the Gibbs sampling algorithm for the
45The re￿ ecting barriers are implemented in the MCMC algorithm with rejection sampling. The details are provided
in the Appendix.
33benchmark model with additional blocks for the Time-Varying Parameters and for the variance-
covariance matrix of !t. Speci￿cally, the additional blocks are:
￿6 = fHg
￿71;:::;T = f￿tg;t = 1;:::;T
Note that, in contrast to the smoothing algorithm needed for the generation of the latent vari-
ables, the smoothing algorithm needed for generating the ￿t￿ s is standard, as the model for the Time
Varying Parameters can be cast into a state-space form with the Measurement Equation being the
latent equation (equation (2000)), and with the Transition Equation being the driftless random walk
equation for ￿t (equation (8)), and then the Kalman ￿lter can be used to obtain the conditional
posteriors for ￿t;t = 1;:::;T: The Appendix provides the details of how this smoothing algorithm
and the rest of the Gibbs sampler for the TVP are implemented.
Four TVP models are estimated: One for the pre-Volcker period, one for the Volcker-Greenspan
period, one for the whole sample, and an additional one for the whole sample that allows for
the possibility of a jump46 in the Time Varying Parameters in August of 1979 (Paul Volcker￿ s
appointment): The motivation for the last model is that if there is a discrete jump at that date,
then a TVP model that does not allow for such a jump will be misspeci￿ed, and will thus potentially
confound important aspects of the dynamics.
The results from the estimation of these 4 models are presented in Figures 4A-D47. There is clear
evidence from all these models of a sharp contrast in the in￿ ation coe¢ cient between the 1970￿ s
and the 1980￿ s: The in￿ ation coe¢ cient is substantially lower (and insigni￿cant too) in the pre-
Volcker period than during the 1980￿ s, and the full-sample results provide evidence of a relatively
rapid increase in the in￿ ation coe¢ cient that begins in the late 1970￿ s and culminates in the 1980￿ s.
46The jump is implemented by drawing the Time Varying Parameters of that date from a conditional posterior
with a higher variance. That higher variance is exogenously speci￿ed, and I tried di⁄erent values, with the results
remaining quite similar in all these checks.
47These ￿gures also contain 90% bands around the estimated parameters. These bands are based on the quantiles
of the conditional posterior distributions of the Time Varying Parameters.
34These results are of course consistent with the policy mistakes hypothesis of CGG and provide
further support to the results obtained with the benchmark model in split sample. There is also
some evidence of an output gap coe¢ cient that is higher and more signi￿cant more often during
the 1970￿ s than during the 1980￿ s.
An interesting aspect of these results that is concealed by the split sample approach is the drop
in the in￿ ation coe¢ cient that occurs during the Greenspan period: The 1990￿ s were a rosy era of
low in￿ ation and low in￿ ationary expectations, overall stability and high growth and these results
may be revealing aspects of a monetary policy that re￿ ected these realities of the 1990￿ s.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence that support the "policy mistakes" hypothesis as an explanation of the
Great In￿ ation and of the stark contrast in US macroeconomic performance between the 1970￿ s and
the 1980￿ s-1990￿ s: There is strong evidence that prior to Paul Volcker￿ s appointment as Chairman
of the Federal Reserve in August of 1979, the Fed was too weak in its response to anticipated
in￿ ation and that under Volcker the Fed adopted a much stronger anti-in￿ ationary stance. The
results also suggest that the pre-Volcker Fed was too activist in its response to real-time estimates
of the output gap that were upwardly biased, while starting with Volcker the Fed adopted a more
cautious approach towards such real-time estimates.
While the Fed￿ s excessive responsiveness to inaccurate real-time estimates of the output gap
during the 1970￿ s probably contributed to the instability of that period, it is clear that, as Clarida,
Gal￿, and Gertler (2000) claim, the Fed￿ s stance towards in￿ ation, which was accommodative prior
to Volcker￿ s appointment, and which shifted dramatically towards strong anti-in￿ ationary policies
under Volcker, was a central factor behind the Great In￿ ation episode of the 1970￿ s and the period
of low in￿ ation and macroeconomic stability that followed.
These results are not necessarily incompatible with alternative theories, such as ones that em-
phasize the role of non-policy shocks, or Time Varying Parameter approaches that suggest that
there were richer dynamics or that changes in policy were more gradual than suggested by CGG.
35Indeed, the central results and conclusions of this paper are preserved when a series of robustness
checks and extensions that incorporate features of these alternative theories are considered.
Thus, these results provide a motivation and empirical support for learning models where the
monetary policy-making authority initially has incorrect perceptions in real time about the structure
of the economy and eventually corrects such misperceptions through accumulated knowledge coming
from past policy mistakes and from the experience of the impact of these mistakes on the economy.
36Appendix: MCMC Algorithms for the Benchmark Model and for
its Extensions
A few words on notation and terminology for what follows ￿rst: ￿ will be taken to mean in what
follows all the variables other than the ones being generated in the particular block under consid-
eration. Furthermore, ff; ff￿; X will denote the entire vector for the dependent variable, the
latent dependent variable, and the entire matrix of explanatory variables, respectively, (periods
1;:::;T), and fft; ff￿
t ; Xt will denote the dependent variable, the latent dependent variable, and
the explanatory variables for period t, respectively. The word "conditional" will be taken to mean
conditional on everything, except of course for the variable(s) being generated in the particular block
under consideration.
Algorithm for the Benchmark Model:
Generating the Variance: Inverted gamma distributions are convenient priors for the variance,
since when multiplied by the conditional likelihood, they result in conditional posteriors which are
also inverted gammas48, that we know how to sample from:
So, if the prior for ￿2 is IG(￿0
2 ; ￿0
2 ), where IG stands for inverted gamma, then the conditional
posterior is also IG(￿1
2 ; ￿1
2 ), where ￿1 = ￿0 +T, and ￿1 = ￿0 +"￿0"￿, where "￿ is the T ￿1 vector of
latent error terms of equation (2).
I conducted experiments using both ￿ at priors49 and various forms of inverted gamma priors (I
let each of the two parameters of the Gamma pdf vary from 0.1 to 10 and I tried various combinations
of the two parameters within that range). The results were quite similar in all these experiments.
Generating the coe¢ cients of the explanatory variables: A ￿ at prior for this block results
in a Gaussian conditional posterior from which I can sample easily: In particular, this conditional
48See, for instance, Kim & Nelson (1999) for the derivation of this.
49An appropriate ￿ at prior for the variance is the positive half of the real line and it results in a posterior for







) and whose support is the positive real line. This is also of the Gamma form.
37posterior is, in a standard way, N((X0X)￿1X0ff￿;￿2(X0X)￿1). For a derivation of this, see, for
instance, Albert and Chib (1993b). I also conducted robustness checks using proper conjugate
Gaussian priors, and the results did not change signi￿cantly.
The required stationarity constraints on the coe¢ cients of the lags of the latent dependent vari-
able are implemented with rejection sampling, whereby draws from the posterior for the coe¢ cients
are taken until the constraints are satis￿ed, (and the draws are discarded when they do not satisfy
the constraints).
Generating the latent dependent variables: I use a single-move smoothing algorithm here,
which entails simulating each ff￿
t , t = 1;:::;T, one by one in separate blocks, while also conditioning
on all the data, and all the other parameters, including all the other latent variables, for each block.
The algorithm is derived as follows:
Let g(ff￿
t j￿;ff;X) denote the conditional distribution of ff￿
t , and let f ff
￿
t denote all the latent
variables for periods 1;:::;t, and let f ff
￿
6=t denote all the latent variables for all periods except for t,
and similarly let f fft denote all the dependent variables for periods 1;:::;t. The dependence on the
parameters other than the latent variables and on the explanatory variables is suppressed in what
follows for convenience. Furthermore, for expositional purposes, I present the case of one lag for
















































































Note that the transition from the 3rd line to the 4th line is valid as fft+1;:::;ffT do not depend
on ff￿
t , given f ff
￿
6=t. Note also that the transition from the 5th line to the 6th line is valid (for the
case of models with one lag for the latent variable) because the denominator of the fraction of the
5th line does not depend on ff￿
t .
The pdf of the resulting distribution, namely g(ff￿
t jff￿
t￿1;ff￿
t+1; f fft) can be obtained from the
joint distribution of all the error terms where ff￿
t appears. For the case with one latent lag, ff￿
t
appears in the equations giving "￿
t, and "￿
t+1. The joint pdf of the error terms is Gaussian, and










;￿2), where ￿;Xt;Xt+1 are de￿ned here to
exclude the latent lag and its coe¢ cient, and ￿1 is the coe¢ cient of the latent lag.
The e⁄ect of conditioning on f fft is a truncation, and the form of the truncation is determined
50Just rewrite, in that joint pdf, each of the error terms as an expression of the latent variables that appear in the
latent equation that corresponds to that error term.
39by equation (3):
If ￿fft 2 category j, then ff￿
t 2 (fft￿1 + cj￿1;fft￿1 + cj);8j;8t:
Thus, the required sampling task is that of sampling from a (univariate) truncated normal. The
best way of doing that is a combination of sampling from a uniform and inverting the truncated
normal cdf. Speci￿cally, I wish to simulate the latent dependent variable, which has a Normal cdf F
with mean ￿ and variance ￿2, but that is truncated between a and b. Let Z ￿ uniform(0;1): Then












￿ ) , where ￿ is the standard normal cdf,







Additional blocks needed for the threshold coe¢ cients:
Here I can adopt a di⁄use prior for the threshold coe¢ cients as then the conditional posterior
becomes a uniform distribution (that we know how to sample from). In particular, it can be
shown (see Albert and Chib (1993b) ) that the conditional posterior for cj;j = 1;:::;J, (where the




t : ￿fft = jg;cj￿1g;minfmin
t
fff￿
t : ￿fft = j + 1g;cj+1g].
Additional blocks needed to implement the regime-switching extension:
Generating the State Variables: The states, S1;:::;ST are Bernoulli random variables. Let
f ST = [S1:::ST]: Let Y1;:::;YT denote the data for periods 1;:::;T, respectively, and let e Yt denote
all the data up to period t;t = 1;:::;T. Let g(f STj￿; f YT) denote the conditional distribution of f ST.
Following Kim and Nelson (1999), I adopt the Multi-Move Gibbs sampling approach; that is, I draw
all of the states together in a single block, that is, from g(f STj￿; f YT), which, as Kim and Nelson
(1999) demonstrate can be simpli￿ed as follows:
g(f STj￿; f YT) = g(S1;:::;STj￿; f YT)
= g(STj￿; f YT)g(ST￿1;:::;S1jST;￿; f YT)
= g(STj￿; f YT)g(ST￿1jST;￿; f YT)g(ST￿2;:::;S1jST;ST￿1;￿; f YT)
= g(STj￿; f YT)g(ST￿1jST;￿; f YT)g(ST￿2jST;ST￿1;￿; f YT):::g(S1jST￿1;:::;S2;￿; f YT)
40= g(STj￿; f YT)g(ST￿1jST;￿; ] YT￿1)g(ST￿2jST￿1;￿; ] YT￿2):::g(S1jS2;Y1)
= g(STj￿; f YT)
YT￿1
t=1 g(StjSt+1;￿; e Yt):
The simpli￿cations above occur because of the Markov property of the states. So, and as
suggested by the last expression, we can generate ￿rst ST conditional on ￿; f YT, and then for t =
T ￿1;:::;1, we generate St conditional on e Yt and St+1. So, I run Hamilton￿ s ￿lter (Hamilton (1989))
to obtain, for all t; g(Stj￿; e Yt), and g(STj￿; f YT) in particular, from which I generate ST. Then I
generate the states of the previous periods using the following:
g(Stj￿; e Yt;St+1) =
g(St;St+1j￿; e Yt)
g(St+1j￿; e Yt) =
g(St+1jSt;￿; e Yt)g(Stj￿; e Yt)
g(St+1j￿; e Yt) :51
Then, using this expression, I calculate Pr[St = 1j￿;St+1; e Yt] as follows:
Pr[St = 1j￿;St+1; e Yt] =
g(St+1jSt=1;￿)g(St=1j￿; e Yt)
P1
j=0 g(St+1jSt=j;￿)g(St=jj￿; e Yt).
To determine whether St is then 0 or 1, I take a draw from the uniform distribution between 0
and 1, and if the generated number is less than or equal to this probability I set St = 1. Otherwise
I set St = 0:
Generating the Transition Probabilities: The beta distribution (used here) is a convenient
conjugate prior for the transition probabilities, as it is easy to sample from a beta distribution. The
priors for q and p are: q~beta(u00;u01); p~beta(u11;u10),
where I set the hyperparameters of the priors equal to di⁄erent values and I observe that the
results are quite similar across these experiments.
The conditional likelihood is: L(q;p) = qn00(1 ￿ q)n01pn11(1 ￿ p)n10;
where nij is equal to the number of transitions from state i to state j, i;j = 0;1:
The resulting posteriors are also beta distributions52:
q~beta(u00 + n00;u01 + n01); p~beta(u11 + n11;u10 + n10).
Generating the Variances: As with the benchmark model, the priors used here are inverted
gammas:
51g(St+1jSt) is the transition probability (generated in separate blocks), and g(Stj￿; e Yt); g(St+1j￿; e Yt) have been
obtained from Hamilton￿ s ￿lter.
52See Kim and Nelson (1999) for a derivation of this result.
41To generate ￿2
0 conditional on h1, I divide both sides of the latent equation by
p
1 + h1St, and
it can be shown that if the conditional prior for ￿2
0 is IG(￿0
2 ; ￿0
2 ), then the conditional posterior is
also IG(￿1
2 ; ￿1
2 ), where ￿1 = ￿0 + T, and ￿1 = ￿0 +
PT
t=1(residuals￿)2, where residuals￿ are equal
to the normalized LHS of the latent equation minus the normalized RHS of the latent equation.
To generate h1 (and thus ￿2
1) conditional on ￿2
0, I divide both sides of the latent equation by ￿0,
and, as before, it can be shown that if the conditional prior for h1 is IG(￿3
2 ; ￿3
2 ), then the conditional
posterior is also IG(￿4
2 ; ￿4
2 ), where ￿4 = ￿3+T￿, and ￿4 = ￿3+
PT￿
t=1(residuals￿)2, where residuals￿
are as before (where now the division is done by ￿0), and where T￿ is equal to the number of periods
during which we are at the high volatility state.
As with the single variance case, I conducted experiments using both ￿ at priors and various
forms of inverted gamma priors (I let each of the two parameters of the Gamma pdf vary from 0.1
to 10 and I tried various combinations of the two parameters within that range). The results were
quite similar in all these experiments.
The normalization constraint that h1 > 0, which means that ￿2
1 is constrained to be the high
state variance and thus that it must be higher than ￿2
0 (that is constrained to be the low state
variance), is implemented with rejection sampling.
Additional blocks needed for the Time Varying Parameters:
Generating the Time Varying Parameters: In contrast to the case of the latent variables,
obtaining the smoothing algorithm for the Time Varying Parameters is standard because here we
can usefully employ a state-space representation, with the Measurement Equation being the latent
equation (equation (2000)), and with the Transition Equation being the driftless random walk for the
TVP￿ s (equation (8)), together with the Kalman ￿lter.
Speci￿cally, let e ￿T = [￿1:::￿T]0. Let Y1;:::;YT denote the data for periods 1;:::;T, respectively,
and let e Yt denote all the data up to period t;t = 1;:::;T. Let g(e ￿Tj￿; f YT) denote the conditional
distribution of e ￿T. Then, following Kim and Nelson (1999) I employ a multimove Gibbs-sampling
approach, thus generating the entire e ￿T as a block from its conditional distribution, g(e ￿Tj￿; f YT).
42The Markov property of the ￿t￿ s ensure that convenient simpli￿cations occur in g(e ￿Tj￿; f YT), and
in particular:
g(e ￿Tj￿; f YT) = g(￿Tj￿; f YT)g(e ￿T￿1j￿;￿T; f YT)
= g(￿Tj￿; f YT)g(￿T￿1j￿;￿T; f YT)g(e ￿T￿2j￿;￿T￿1;￿T; f YT)
= :::
= g(￿Tj￿; f YT)g(￿T￿1j￿;￿T; f YT)g(￿T￿2j￿;￿T￿1; f YT):::g(￿1j￿;￿2; f YT)
= g(￿Tj￿; f YT)g(￿T￿1j￿;￿T; ] YT￿1)g(e ￿T￿2j￿;￿T￿1; ] YT￿2):::g(￿1j￿;￿2;f Y1)




As suggested by this last expression, I ￿rst need to generate ￿T from g(￿Tj￿; f YT), and then,
given ￿t+1, generate ￿t from g(￿tj￿;￿t+1; e Yt);t =;:::;T ￿ 1. Thus, I ￿rst generate ￿T from
g(￿Tj￿; f YT)~N(￿TjT;PTjT), and then ￿t; for t = T￿1;::;1 from g(￿tj￿;￿t+1; e Yt)~N(￿tjt;￿t+1;Ptjt;￿t+1),
where ￿TjT = E(￿Tj￿; f YT); PTjT = Cov(￿Tj￿; f YT); ￿tjt;￿t+1 = E(￿tj￿; e Yt;￿t+1) = E(￿tj￿;￿tjt;￿t+1);
Ptjt;￿t+1 = Cov(￿Tj￿; f YT;￿t+1) = Cov(￿Tj￿;￿tjt;￿t+1). The updating terms ￿TjT;PTjT; (and also
all ￿tjt;Ptjt;t = 1;:::;T) can be derived in a standard way using the Kalman ￿lter53. The same
holds true for the terms ￿tjt;￿t+1, and Ptjt;￿t+1 since they can also be viewed as updating terms in
which the updating is done not with Yt, but with ￿t+1, which has been generated, and thus can be
considered as observed data.
The initial values, ￿0j0 are arbitrary, with P0j0 having large diagonal elements (so that large
uncertainty is attached to ￿0j0).
The re￿ ecting barriers imposing the stability condition on the coe¢ cients of the lags of the
dependent variable are implemented with rejection sampling, done separately for each time period
t = 1;:::;T:
Generating the precision matrix H: The prior for H is Wishart, W(￿0;H0), where I set
￿0 = 0;H￿1
0 = 0, and then the conditional posterior for H is also Wishart, W(￿1;H1), where




(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1)(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1)
0
]￿1.
53See Hamilton (1994), and Kim and Nelson (1999).
43A note on the computer code: All of the computer code for this paper was written in Gauss,
Version 3.2.34. The seed was always ￿xed at 180303.
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1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
51variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept 0.0108 0.1555 0.0069 -0.2637 -0.2252 -0.1819 0.2037 0.2783 0.3406
variance 0.1593 0.0598 0.1466 0.0777 0.0836 0.0961 0.2408 0.2708 0.3061
1st lag 0.7544 0.0685 0.7627 0.5782 0.6292 0.6653 0.83 0.8475 0.8635
inflation 0.4808 0.1363 0.4648 0.2567 0.2838 0.3174 0.6544 0.7229 0.7952
output gap 0.4035 0.1006 0.3908 0.2401 0.2605 0.2879 0.5332 0.5947 0.647
intercept 0.0256 0.159 0.0207 -0.2641 -0.2129 -0.172 0.2224 0.312 0.3579
variance 0.1659 0.0638 0.1526 0.0777 0.0863 0.0974 0.2512 0.2837 0.3098
1st lag 0.7542 0.0668 0.7657 0.5903 0.6228 0.6686 0.8287 0.844 0.8648
inflation 0.4754 0.1325 0.4617 0.2532 0.283 0.3204 0.6433 0.7049 0.78
output gap 0.4042 0.1003 0.3892 0.2422 0.2601 0.2907 0.5363 0.5938 0.6421
intercept 0.0182 0.1538 0.0124 -0.2609 -0.2161 -0.17 0.2112 0.271 0.3358
variance 0.1588 0.057 0.1471 0.0798 0.0885 0.0986 0.2356 0.2694 0.3039
1st lag 0.7658 0.0663 0.7733 0.6099 0.6465 0.676 0.842 0.8593 0.8732
inflation 0.4502 0.1335 0.4392 0.2253 0.2531 0.2931 0.6268 0.6737 0.7421
output gap 0.3983 0.1001 0.3879 0.2354 0.2567 0.2817 0.5221 0.5858 0.6358
Note: The last 7 columns are quantiles of the posterior distibution.
Value of target at end of FOMC months
Table 1
Greenspan Period
FOMC monthly averages of fed funds rate
FOMC monthly averages of target
Figure 2








1987 1990 1993 1996
Fed Funds Rate, FOMC Monthly Averages Target, FOMC Monthly Averages
Target, end-of-FOMC month values
52variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept 0.9548 0.4496 0.9676 0.0755 0.2338 0.3988 1.5274 1.6921 1.8477
variance 1.1297 0.2374 1.0935 0.7517 0.7925 0.8518 1.4398 1.5615 1.6794
1st lag 0.8664 0.0489 0.8672 0.7623 0.7819 0.8027 0.9267 0.94 0.9641
inflation 0.0682 0.0808 0.0676 -0.0809 -0.0596 -0.033 0.1769 0.2038 0.2326
output gap 0.3006 0.1 0.3004 0.1111 0.1376 0.1729 0.4251 0.4666 0.4941
intercept 0.9451 0.4472 0.956 0.0531 0.2338 0.3838 1.4903 1.6664 1.8351
variance 1.1216 0.2364 1.0856 0.7403 0.7806 0.8314 1.4465 1.5747 1.6534
1st lag 0.8661 0.0474 0.8687 0.7623 0.7817 0.802 0.9261 0.9368 0.9526
inflation 0.0704 0.08 0.0691 -0.0716 -0.0484 -0.0272 0.1817 0.2045 0.2254
output gap 0.3014 0.0996 0.3009 0.1081 0.1394 0.1715 0.4317 0.4671 0.4906
intercept 0.9645 0.4522 0.973 0.082 0.2288 0.4021 1.5374 1.7037 1.9593
variance 1.1378 0.2383 1.1039 0.7705 0.814 0.8656 1.437 1.5324 1.7086
1st lag 0.8668 0.0505 0.8666 0.7656 0.7838 0.8027 0.9282 0.9466 0.971
inflation 0.066 0.0815 0.0636 -0.0837 -0.0658 -0.0344 0.165 0.1936 0.2362
output gap 0.2997 0.1004 0.2999 0.1127 0.1337 0.1742 0.4242 0.4647 0.4951
variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept -0.0439 0.279 -0.0281 -0.5669 -0.5025 -0.4088 0.3199 0.401 0.4955
variance 1.2317 0.196 1.2084 0.902 0.943 0.9919 1.4954 1.5877 1.6677
1st lag 0.7679 0.0435 0.7668 0.6826 0.6958 0.7117 0.823 0.8396 0.8535
inflation 0.4518 0.0865 0.4555 0.2683 0.3054 0.343 0.5552 0.5882 0.6256
output gap 0.1144 0.0874 0.1133 -0.0532 -0.0301 -0.0007 0.23 0.265 0.2875
intercept -0.0378 0.2695 -0.0231 -0.5487 -0.4879 -0.3941 0.3163 0.4054 0.5055
variance 1.2171 0.1839 1.2005 0.8945 0.9412 0.9929 1.4652 1.5274 1.645
1st lag 0.7688 0.0424 0.7668 0.6882 0.6963 0.7165 0.8238 0.8408 0.8524
inflation 0.4487 0.0843 0.4532 0.27 0.3021 0.3393 0.5507 0.5825 0.6108
output gap 0.1115 0.0836 0.1119 -0.0532 -0.0353 0.0049 0.2224 0.2564 0.2908
intercept -0.05 0.2882 -0.0338 -0.5914 -0.5273 -0.4269 0.336 0.3983 0.4955
variance 1.2464 0.2066 1.225 0.9098 0.9516 0.9907 1.534 1.6198 1.6802
1st lag 0.767 0.0446 0.767 0.6745 0.6939 0.7103 0.8214 0.8369 0.8556
inflation 0.455 0.0886 0.4565 0.2683 0.3054 0.3482 0.561 0.5967 0.6458
output gap 0.1173 0.091 0.1138 -0.0523 -0.0296 -0.0034 0.2366 0.2695 0.2842
Note: Benchmark specification with 1 lag of the dependent variable.
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Figure 3A
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Figure 3B
Histograms of Posterior Distributions, Benchmark Model, Volcker-Greenspan Period
55variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept 0.9356 0.4392 0.9186 0.0721 0.2163 0.3811 1.4958 1.648 1.8073
variance 0.9956 0.2023 0.9776 0.6604 0.7078 0.7527 1.2621 1.3614 1.4329
1st lag 0.7471 0.1324 0.7437 0.5002 0.5298 0.5759 0.9192 0.9637 1.0185
2nd lag 0.1446 0.1315 0.1465 -0.1242 -0.0692 -0.0224 0.3136 0.3567 0.3852
inflation 0.0426 0.076 0.0407 -0.0988 -0.0825 -0.055 0.1366 0.1771 0.1975
output gap 0.3246 0.1004 0.3236 0.1236 0.1555 0.1917 0.4485 0.4899 0.5273
intercept 0.9581 0.4305 0.9564 0.1795 0.2535 0.4299 1.5292 1.6498 1.8073
variance 0.9812 0.1959 0.9586 0.6543 0.7013 0.7527 1.2472 1.3257 1.4036
1st lag 0.7505 0.1275 0.7524 0.498 0.5424 0.5749 0.9109 0.9594 1.0025
2nd lag 0.1428 0.1292 0.1446 -0.1025 -0.0692 -0.0203 0.3151 0.3574 0.3803
inflation 0.0368 0.0753 0.0358 -0.1053 -0.0866 -0.0623 0.1335 0.1755 0.1894
output gap 0.3283 0.0998 0.3295 0.1211 0.1555 0.1994 0.448 0.4899 0.5178
intercept 0.9131 0.447 0.9114 0.0261 0.1619 0.348 1.4582 1.6307 1.8641
variance 1.0101 0.2078 1.0045 0.6685 0.7117 0.7527 1.2729 1.3871 1.4782
1st lag 0.7436 0.1372 0.7376 0.5015 0.5244 0.5759 0.9251 0.969 1.0376
2nd lag 0.1465 0.1338 0.1473 -0.1264 -0.0701 -0.0259 0.3131 0.3563 0.3979
inflation 0.0485 0.0764 0.0483 -0.0922 -0.0752 -0.0501 0.1414 0.1794 0.2163
output gap 0.3209 0.1011 0.3174 0.1316 0.1521 0.1857 0.452 0.4899 0.5291
variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept -0.0455 0.2833 -0.0488 -0.5756 -0.4926 -0.41 0.3324 0.447 0.5006
variance 1.2293 0.2007 1.2099 0.8723 0.922 0.9869 1.4853 1.5926 1.6777
1st lag 0.7359 0.1059 0.7381 0.5237 0.5634 0.6067 0.8689 0.9145 0.9506
2nd lag 0.0299 0.0975 0.0318 -0.1635 -0.1332 -0.0927 0.1509 0.1866 0.2211
inflation 0.4595 0.0888 0.4606 0.276 0.3121 0.3479 0.5729 0.611 0.6369
output gap 0.1131 0.0872 0.1112 -0.0712 -0.037 -0.0022 0.2261 0.2586 0.2867
intercept -0.0499 0.2899 -0.0472 -0.6045 -0.5237 -0.4235 0.3301 0.4455 0.4845
variance 1.2242 0.2008 1.2044 0.8587 0.9074 0.9731 1.4687 1.5845 1.6803
1st lag 0.731 0.1102 0.73 0.5068 0.5578 0.6003 0.8696 0.9218 0.9608
2nd lag 0.0359 0.1034 0.0453 -0.1707 -0.1484 -0.1101 0.1613 0.1958 0.2358
inflation 0.4596 0.0883 0.4623 0.2659 0.3075 0.3479 0.568 0.6061 0.6236
output gap 0.1157 0.0893 0.1137 -0.0722 -0.0343 0.0026 0.2343 0.2632 0.2878
intercept -0.0412 0.2767 -0.057 -0.5244 -0.4727 -0.398 0.3324 0.447 0.5662
variance 1.2344 0.2007 1.2181 0.8935 0.9291 1.0002 1.4963 1.5955 1.6705
1st lag 0.7409 0.1012 0.7468 0.5495 0.5791 0.6097 0.8688 0.9091 0.9421
2nd lag 0.0238 0.0909 0.023 -0.1462 -0.1221 -0.0856 0.1384 0.1713 0.2024
inflation 0.4595 0.0894 0.4559 0.2963 0.3183 0.347 0.5765 0.6129 0.6407
output gap 0.1105 0.085 0.11 -0.0706 -0.0387 -0.0067 0.2195 0.2484 0.276
Note: Benchmark specification with 2 lags of the dependent variable.










56variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept 0.9719 0.4289 0.9627 0.1484 0.2933 0.4368 1.5111 1.6939 1.7968
variance 1.0825 0.211 1.0622 0.724 0.7798 0.83 1.3447 1.4446 1.5276
1st lag 0.806 0.0536 0.809 0.6962 0.71 0.7332 0.8717 0.89 0.9039
inflation 0.1586 0.0745 0.1581 0.0105 0.0332 0.0628 0.2531 0.2817 0.3002
output gap 0.3716 0.1047 0.3671 0.1773 0.2038 0.2365 0.5084 0.538 0.5776
intercept 1.1139 0.4062 1.1045 0.3724 0.4543 0.5789 1.6488 1.8077 1.9074
variance 0.9969 0.1949 0.9781 0.6548 0.7047 0.7624 1.2473 1.3441 1.408
1st lag 0.7766 0.0585 0.7791 0.6607 0.6763 0.6998 0.8505 0.8732 0.8905
inflation 0.168 0.0761 0.1683 0.0196 0.0435 0.0731 0.2649 0.2914 0.3118
output gap 0.4182 0.1086 0.418 0.2109 0.242 0.2792 0.5578 0.5896 0.6281
intercept 1.5299 0.4589 1.5261 0.654 0.8093 0.9675 2.1268 2.3443 2.4859
variance 1.0032 0.2014 0.9876 0.6515 0.7065 0.7603 1.2656 1.3821 1.4436
1st lag 0.7423 0.0683 0.7433 0.6062 0.6241 0.6511 0.8274 0.8538 0.8688
inflation 0.1288 0.0661 0.1284 0.0039 0.0228 0.045 0.2129 0.242 0.2676
output gap 0.4764 0.1264 0.4736 0.2427 0.2738 0.3137 0.639 0.6919 0.7486
variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept -0.0201 0.2829 -0.0067 -0.556 -0.4786 -0.3931 0.3465 0.4354 0.5371
variance 1.338 0.2114 1.3161 0.9824 1.0276 1.0798 1.6191 1.7157 1.8195
1st lag 0.803 0.0435 0.8021 0.7179 0.7305 0.7481 0.858 0.8748 0.8883
inflation 0.3649 0.085 0.3698 0.1767 0.221 0.2602 0.4681 0.4991 0.5335
output gap 0.1422 0.0914 0.1419 -0.0361 -0.0094 0.0208 0.264 0.297 0.3291
intercept 0.0486 0.271 0.063 -0.4593 -0.4037 -0.3106 0.3954 0.4901 0.5768
variance 1.3476 0.2123 1.3252 0.9863 1.0262 1.0867 1.6331 1.7336 1.8252
1st lag 0.809 0.0435 0.8093 0.7211 0.7343 0.7528 0.8624 0.8786 0.8908
inflation 0.3245 0.0777 0.3271 0.1593 0.1922 0.2266 0.4205 0.4517 0.4785
output gap 0.1714 0.0918 0.1721 -0.0088 0.0184 0.051 0.2898 0.3261 0.3604
intercept 0.1416 0.2544 0.1548 -0.3444 -0.2749 -0.1907 0.4715 0.5412 0.6403
variance 1.2766 0.2026 1.2505 0.9322 0.9828 1.0283 1.5496 1.6379 1.7368
1st lag 0.7931 0.0419 0.793 0.7085 0.7238 0.7406 0.8458 0.8598 0.8717
inflation 0.3322 0.0683 0.3354 0.1857 0.2174 0.2442 0.4167 0.4418 0.4621
output gap 0.1727 0.089 0.1698 0.0009 0.0236 0.0569 0.2868 0.3209 0.3485
Note: Alternative Forecast Horizons - Benchmark specification with 1 lag of the dependent variable.










57variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept 0.9182 0.4186 0.9183 0.0999 0.2518 0.3976 1.4528 1.6212 1.8183
variance 0.9214 0.1931 0.8997 0.6108 0.6529 0.6972 1.1702 1.2692 1.3756
1st lag 0.8894 0.0453 0.8904 0.7933 0.8118 0.8284 0.9462 0.96 0.9798
inflation 0.0373 0.0714 0.0355 -0.097 -0.0724 -0.0489 0.1285 0.1556 0.1818
output gap 0.2826 0.0891 0.2831 0.1132 0.1365 0.1696 0.3957 0.4266 0.4562
intercept 0.9251 0.4275 0.9143 0.0822 0.2461 0.3976 1.4669 1.6311 1.8212
variance 0.9234 0.1928 0.8963 0.6113 0.65 0.6997 1.1844 1.2682 1.3756
1st lag 0.8892 0.0451 0.8899 0.7914 0.8118 0.8268 0.9463 0.9603 0.9792
inflation 0.0361 0.0698 0.0345 -0.0947 -0.0695 -0.0451 0.1279 0.1556 0.1894
output gap 0.2827 0.0882 0.2811 0.1134 0.1404 0.1686 0.3974 0.4259 0.4575
intercept 0.9114 0.4097 0.9225 0.1075 0.2518 0.392 1.4289 1.5814 1.7918
variance 0.9193 0.1936 0.9026 0.6108 0.6529 0.6933 1.1533 1.2692 1.3774
1st lag 0.8895 0.0455 0.8906 0.7983 0.8107 0.8294 0.9459 0.9571 0.9805
inflation 0.0385 0.0731 0.0375 -0.097 -0.0748 -0.0534 0.1285 0.1556 0.1818
output gap 0.2825 0.0901 0.2837 0.1132 0.1342 0.17 0.3939 0.4283 0.4562
variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept -0.0541 0.2651 -0.0426 -0.5502 -0.4878 -0.3975 0.2937 0.3796 0.4612
variance 1.1051 0.179 1.0882 0.7965 0.8413 0.8926 1.3393 1.425 1.5113
1st lag 0.7823 0.0407 0.7814 0.6999 0.7167 0.7292 0.8331 0.8482 0.8575
inflation 0.428 0.0806 0.4296 0.2529 0.2861 0.3301 0.5257 0.5528 0.5884
output gap 0.1112 0.0825 0.11 -0.0495 -0.0267 0.0044 0.2184 0.2524 0.2785
intercept -0.0495 0.2557 -0.0418 -0.5278 -0.4698 -0.3801 0.2871 0.3599 0.4514
variance 1.0899 0.1677 1.0708 0.7927 0.8348 0.897 1.3152 1.3709 1.4946
1st lag 0.7834 0.0394 0.7818 0.7069 0.7181 0.7314 0.8337 0.8507 0.8573
inflation 0.4248 0.0783 0.4275 0.2527 0.2893 0.3225 0.5221 0.5447 0.5715
output gap 0.1086 0.079 0.1101 -0.0494 -0.0274 0.0057 0.2094 0.2498 0.2824
intercept -0.0587 0.2743 -0.0447 -0.5719 -0.5089 -0.4294 0.3076 0.3849 0.4683
variance 1.1204 0.1885 1.1096 0.8113 0.8432 0.8896 1.3646 1.4557 1.5208
1st lag 0.7812 0.042 0.7801 0.6946 0.7105 0.7254 0.8326 0.8469 0.8628
inflation 0.4312 0.0828 0.4319 0.2571 0.2858 0.3318 0.5274 0.564 0.6088
output gap 0.1137 0.0859 0.1094 -0.0495 -0.0241 0.0022 0.2264 0.2541 0.2763
Note: Specification with alternative threshold values.










58variable mean std. dev. median 2.5% qntl 5% qntl 10% qntl 90% qntl 95% qntl 97.5% qntl
intercept 0.99 0.5052 0.9887 0.0204 0.1702 0.3685 1.6201 1.8504 1.9956
low variance 1.0908 0.2325 1.0653 0.7027 0.7563 0.8163 1.3997 1.5395 1.6322
high variance 1.5684 1.0332 1.3651 0.8326 0.8968 0.9733 2.1263 2.7755 3.4461
1st lag 0.709 0.1266 0.713 0.464 0.4993 0.5416 0.8618 0.916 0.9547
2nd lag 0.1737 0.1226 0.1777 -0.0712 -0.021 0.0194 0.3296 0.3742 0.4084
inflation 0.0448 0.0826 0.0437 -0.1146 -0.091 -0.0614 0.148 0.1816 0.2078
output gap 0.3325 0.1107 0.3321 0.1091 0.1441 0.193 0.4743 0.5104 0.5524
intercept -0.1824 0.3458 -0.1776 -0.8788 -0.7454 -0.6027 0.2291 0.3685 0.5451
low variance 1.4258 0.239 1.4132 0.9996 1.0579 1.1272 1.7444 1.8517 1.9457
high variance 11.0306 14.942 6.8423 1.3883 1.6035 2.7019 22.4079 33.1521 42.0234
1st lag 0.6465 0.1217 0.6513 0.4169 0.4351 0.479 0.7984 0.8337 0.8796
2nd lag 0.1116 0.112 0.1083 -0.1085 -0.0786 -0.0262 0.2675 0.2992 0.327
inflation 0.5182 0.1139 0.5209 0.2981 0.3237 0.3698 0.6639 0.6951 0.7363
output gap 0.0998 0.1016 0.0988 -0.109 -0.0657 -0.0226 0.23 0.2688 0.3052
Volcker-Greenspan Period
Table 6
2-state Markov Switching specification for variance
Pre-Volcker Period
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Figure 4D: Time Varying Parameters (and 90% bands), 1969-1998
(allowing for the possibility of a jump in August of 1979)
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